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1 Administration has been the leading non-terminal insolvency procedure in the 
United Kingdom since the Enterprise Act 20021 reforms to the Insolvency Act 1986 
(the “Act”).2 The introduction of a streamlined process, including the ability to 
appoint administrators out-of-court, has resulted in administration accounting for 
between 55-77% of all non-terminal processes each year since 2003, compared to a 
high of 23% before the reforms.3 
 
2 The reforms allowed the holder of a qualifying floating charge,4 a company or its 
directors5 to appoint administrators by the filing of prescribed documentation in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act and Insolvency Rules 1986 (the 
“Rules”).6 The court also retained the power to appoint administrators upon petition 
by a variety of interested parties.7 A clear majority of all administration 
appointments are now made by the company or its directors out-of-court, under 
paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Act.8 This has, however, not been without 
problem. 
                                                 
* Chris Umfreville is a Senior Lecturer and Course Leader of the Legal Practice Course at the 
University of Wolverhampton, United Kingdom. 
1 Enterprise Act 2002 (2002 c.40). 
2 Insolvency Act 1986 (1986 c.45). 
3 Available at: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140311023846/http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/o
therinformation/statistics/historicdata/HDmenu.htm> (last viewed 3 December 2014). 
4 Paragraph 14, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
5 Ibid., paragraph 22. 
6 Insolvency Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1925). 
7 Paragraph 10, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
8 See, for example, C. Umfreville, P. Walton and P. Wilson, “Pre-Pack Empirical Research: 
Characteristic and Outcome Analysis of Pre-Pack Administration” (2014), Part A1.6, available at: 
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3 With the court no longer directly involved in every administration appointment, it 
has become possible for an administrator to appear to have been appointed, only 
for the validity of the appointment to be questioned subsequently on grounds of 
procedural irregularity. Since the introduction of the abovementioned reforms to 
the administration procedure in September 2003, there have been a number of cases 
which have considered this issue, with a plethora of decisions between 2011 and 
2012. A significant number of these focused on the requirement of the company or 
its directors to give notice of intention to appoint administrators to persons detailed 
in Rule 2.20(2) of the Rules and the associated effect of failing to give such notice.9 
These cases have failed to reach a consensus of the impact of such failure, leaving 
practitioners with a great deal of uncertainty. 
 
4 Although the matter appears to have been resolved at first instance, in line with 
the judgment of HHJ Purle in Re BXL Services,10 the current denouement lacks 
certainty and, in the words of Mann J: 
 
“…[u]ntil there is a clarification in the [Insolvency R]ules or a decision of the Court of 
Appeal the position will remain uncertain.”11 
 
5 Whilst no decision has yet been referred to the appellate courts, reform is being 
proposed to both the Act and the Rules to address these issues.12 
 
6 The purpose of this article is to consider the current technical requirements under 
the Act and the related Rules and the potential effects of the proposed reforms. The 
manner in which the courts have considered and interpreted these requirements will 
be reviewed and it will be suggested that the current position has come about as a 
result of a mis-interpretation of the underlying requirements. It will also be 
suggested that the proposed reforms, to both the primary and secondary legislation, 
may exacerbate rather than resolve the current difficulties. Hereafter, save as 
otherwise indicated, any reference to a paragraph will be those in Schedule B1 of 
the Act and any reference to a rule will be those in the Rules. 
                                                                                                                 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration> (last 
viewed 20 November 2014). 
9 See, for example, Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company  
[2010] EWHC 3726 (Ch); Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 
1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 798; Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch); 
National Westminster Bank plc v (1) Msaada Group (a firm), (2) Gary Steven Pettit, (3) Alan Redvers 
Price (Joint Supervisors of Msaada Group), (4) Gordon Craig [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch); Re MF 
Global Overseas Ltd (in administration), Re MF Global Finance Europe Ltd (in administration) 
[2012] EWHC 1091 (Ch). 
10 [2012] EWHC 1877 (Ch). 
11 Re MF Global Overseas Ltd (in administration), Re MF Global Finance Europe Ltd (in 
administration) [2012] EWHC 1091 (Ch), at paragraph 12. 
12 See the Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15 and the Insolvency Rules 2015 Consultation Draft. 
These are considered in detail in the paragraphs 97-119 below, which deal with attempts at reform. 
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A Question of Construction: An Overview of the Legislative Provisions 
 
7 At the heart of the debate over the necessity to give notice of intention to appoint 
administrators to the parties in Rule 2.20(2) is the somewhat confusing inter-
relationship of the provisions of paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 30. It is important to 
consider these provisions to understand the differing views expressed by the courts. 
 
The Legislative Provisions 
 
8 Paragraph 26, entitled “Notice of intention to appoint”, provides: 
 
“ 26(1) A person who proposes to make an appointment under paragraph 22 shall give at 
 least five business days’ written notice to– 
(a)  any person who is or may be entitled to appoint an administrative receiver of the 
 company, and 
(b)  any person who is or may be entitled to appoint an administrator of the company 
 under paragraph 14. 
26(2) A person who proposes to make an appointment under paragraph 22 shall also 
give such notice as may be prescribed to such other persons as may be 
prescribed. 
26(3) A notice under this paragraph must– 
(a)  identify the proposed administrator, and 
(b)  be in the prescribed form.”13 
 
9 The only form prescribed for the giving of such notice is Form 2.8B, entitled 
“Notice of intention to appoint an administrator by company or director(s)”.14 The 
subsequent appointment by the company or directors would be made by the filing at 
court of Form 2.9B, entitled “Notice of appointment of an administrator by 
company or director(s) (where a notice of intention to appoint has been issued)”.15 
 
10 Paragraph 27 sets out the requirements for filing the notice of intention to 
appoint at court, including the requirement for the company representative or 
director to make a statutory declaration as to the company’s insolvency and the 
ability to make the appointment.16 A restriction on the exercise of this power is then 
imposed by paragraph 28, which states: 
 
“ 28(1)  An appointment may not be made under paragraph 22 unless the person who 
 makes the appointment has complied with the requirement of paragraphs 26 and 
 27 and– 
(a) the period of notice specified in paragraph 26(1) has expired, or 
                                                 
13 Paragraph 26, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
14 Schedule 4, Insolvency Rules 1986. Form available at: <www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/forms/2-
8b.pdf> (last viewed 30 November 2014). 
15 Idem. Form available at: <www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/forms/2-9b.pdf> (last viewed 30 November 
2014). 
16 Paragraph 27, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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(b) each person to whom notice has been given under paragraph 26(1) has consented 
in writing to the making of the appointment. 
28(2) An appointment may not be made under paragraph 22 after the period of ten 
business days beginning with the date on which the notice of intention to appoint 
is filed under paragraph 27(1).”17 
 
11 So far, it would seem, so simple. If a company or its directors wish to appoint an 
administrator out-of-court, notice in a prescribed form (Form 2.8B) identifying the 
administrator must first be filed at court, together with certain statutory 
declarations, and given to any person entitled to appoint either an administrator 
pursuant to paragraph 14 or an administrative receiver (essentially the holder of a 
qualifying floating charge, hereafter referred to as a “QFCH”) and such other 
persons as may be prescribed.18 The appointment cannot be made without 
complying with these requirements. At least five business days’ notice to QFCHs 
under paragraph 26(1) must be given before the appointment can be made, unless 
all such charge holders provide earlier consent in writing.19 It has, until now, 
commonly been held that Rule 2.20(2) prescribes persons who are to be given 
notice pursuant to paragraph 26(2),20 requiring: 
 
“2.20(2) [Copy of notice to be sent to] A copy of the notice of intention to appoint must, in 
addition to the persons specified in paragraph 26, be given to– 
(a) any enforcement officer who, to the knowledge of the person giving the 
notice, is charged with execution or other legal process against the 
company; 
(b) any person who, to the knowledge of the person giving the notice, has 
distrained against the company or its property; 
(c) any supervisor of a voluntary arrangement under Part I of the Act; and 
(d) the company, if the company is not intending to make the appointment.”21 
 
12 The situation is, however, slightly confused by paragraph 30, which adds: 
 
“30  In a case in which no person is entitled to notice of intention to appoint under 
paragraph 26(1) (and paragraph 28 therefore does not apply)– 
                                                 
17 Ibid., paragraph 28. 
18 Ibid., paragraphs 26-27. 
19 Ibid., paragraph 28. 
20 See, for example, Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company 
[2010] EWHC 3726 (Ch), at paragraph 41; Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another 
[2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 798, at paragraph 57; Re Virtualpurple Professional 
Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at paragraph 6; National Westminster Bank plc v (1) Msaada 
Group (a firm) [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at paragraphs 39 and 46. 
21 Rule 2.20(2), Insolvency Rules 1986. The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent was 
abolished and replaced with a process known as commercial rent arrears recovery (“CRAR”) by 
sections 71-72, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (2007 c.15), which came into force on 
6 April 2014. As a consequence of the insertion by paragraph 85 of Schedule 13 of that Act of a 
definition of “distress” in section 436, Insolvency Act 1986, reference in the Rules to levying distress, 
seizing goods and related expressions shall be construed in accordance with the procedures in Schedule 
12, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (i.e. CRAR). For more detail, see I. Fletcher, 
“Abolition of the Remedy of Distress - At last!” (2014) 27(8) Insolvency Intelligence 127. 
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(a) the statutory declaration accompanying the notice of appointment must include the 
statements and information required under paragraph 27(2), and 
(b) paragraph 29(2)(c) shall not apply.”22 
 
13 It would therefore appear that if there is no QFCH to whom notice need be 
given under paragraph 26(1), there is no requirement to give any notice of the 
intention to appoint administrators, as the restrictions on making the appointment in 
paragraph 28 are dis-applied.23 The relevant statements as to the company’s 
solvency and ability to make the appointment are made instead in the Form 2.10B, 
entitled “Notice of appointment of an administrator by company or director(s) 
(where a notice of intention to appoint has not been issued)”,24 which alone is used 
to effect the appointment, rather than the two-stage process involving Forms 2.8B 
and 2.9B referred to above. 
 
14 Whilst this may appear sensible at first glance, the wording of paragraph 30 
overlooks the possibility of notice being required to be given to further parties as 
may be prescribed under paragraph 26(2). This disconnect has been the source of 
much of the judicial debate and, importantly, contrasting judgments as to the 
necessity to give notice of a proposed appointment to the persons listed in Rule 
2.20(2), and the consequences of failing to do so. 
 
Significance of the Judicial Debate 
 
15 This debate is of upmost importance to insolvency practitioners. On the one 
hand, failure to give notice to the persons in Rule 2.20(2) could be viewed as a 
procedural defect. In such a case, the insolvency practitioner may be protected by 
the Act and the Rules. Rule 7.55 provides that any formal defect or irregularity 
shall not invalidate proceedings, unless the court considers that: 
 
“…substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity…” 
 
that cannot be remedied by any order it could make.25 Furthermore, under 
paragraph 104 any act of the administrator will be valid in spite of any defect in the 
appointment.26 
 
16 In the alternative, failure to give such notice could be deemed to invalidate the 
purported appointment. If there is no appointment, then the provisions of Rule 7.55 
and paragraph 104 do not come into play. The insolvency practitioner, who may 
have exercised the powers believed to be held under Schedule 1 of the Act, could 
                                                 
22 Paragraph 30, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
23 Idem. 
24 Ibid., paragraph 30(a) and Schedule 4, Insolvency Rules 1986. Form available at: 
<www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/forms/2-10b.pdf> (last viewed 30 November 2014). 
25 Rule 7.55, Insolvency Rules 1986. 
26 Paragraph 104, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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therefore find themselves personally liable for acts carried out in pursuance of their 
purported appointment, such as wrongful interference with goods.27 Whilst the 
insolvency practitioner could notionally rely on the indemnity from his appointor 
pursuant to paragraph 34,28 this is likely to be of little benefit when given by an 
insolvent company or its directors. 
 
17 It is, therefore, crucially important to understand the nature and the extent of the 
requirement for directors to give notice of intention to appoint administrators to the 
persons set out in Rule 2.20(2). 
 
 
The Judicial Interpretation of Rule 2.20(2) and Paragraph 26(2) 
 
18 The requirements of paragraph 26 and Rule 2.20(2) have received considerable 
attention in the courts of first instance, with a variety of decisions reached. Four 
cases in particular, Hill v Stokes,29 Minmar (929) Ltd v Khalatschi (“Minmar”), 30 
Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd (“Virtualpurple”)31 and National 
Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group and others (“Msaada”),32 have had a 
profound impact on the insolvency profession. These decisions need to be reviewed 
to understand the current approach of the judiciary to the requirements for a 
company or its directors validly to give notice of their intention to appoint 
administrators. 
 
The First Decision: Hill v Stokes 
 
19 The first reported case to consider the requirements of service on the parties 
listed in Rule 2.20(2) and the effect of non-compliance was Hill v Stokes, in 
November 2010. The case concerned the appointment of administrators by the 
company’s directors pursuant to paragraph 22. Notice of the intention to appoint 
administrators was served on the company’s QFCH and on the company itself. 
However, following the appointment it became apparent that various landlords of 
the company, that had distrained for arrears of rent, had not been given notice of 
the intended appointment pursuant to Rule 2.20(2)(b). It was apparent that the 
directors had been aware of the distraint,33 so the question arose as to the 
consequence of failing to give notice. 
                                                 
27 See, for example, the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (1977 c.32). 
28 Paragraph 34, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
29 Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company [2010] EWHC 3726 
(Ch). 
30 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159; (Ch) [2012] 1 BCLC 
798. 
31 [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch). 
32 National Westminster Bank plc v (1) Msaada Group (a firm), (2) Gary Steven Pettit, (3) Alan 
Redvers Price (Joint Supervisors of Msaada Group), (4) Gordon Craig [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch). 
33 Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company [2010] EWHC 3726 
(Ch), at paragraph 15. 
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20 In order to understand the consequences of the directors’ omission, HHJ 
McCahill undertook a detailed analysis of the provisions of Schedule B1 of the Act 
and the Rules. Rejecting the suggestion that Rule 2.20(2) did not prescribe persons 
for the purpose of paragraph 26(2),34 the issue appeared to hinge on the 
construction of paragraph 28. HHJ McCahill came to the conclusion that the first 
reference therein to paragraph 26 should in fact be to paragraph 26(1), specifically 
the requirement to give notice to any QFCH.35 On this basis, it was not mandatory 
to serve notice of an intended appointment on those parties stipulated in Rule 
2.20(2), as such parties were not prescribed by paragraph 26(1). This conclusion 
was justified on six grounds: 
 
1. No minimum notice period for such persons is provided, suggesting they are only 
given notice for information purposes;36 
2. The obligations under Rule 2.20(2) are not absolute, arising only where the company 
or directors have knowledge of the existence of the specified persons;37 
3. Only a copy of the notice of intention is required to be given under Rule 2.20(2), and 
the prescribed Form 2.8B makes no provision for detailing such persons;38 
4. The effect of non-service on the persons detailed in Rule 2.20(2) is not readily 
apparent from the Rules;39 
5. Paragraph 30 suggests that no notice need be given if there is no QFCH to be given 
notice pursuant to paragraph 26(1);40 
6. Only the consent of QFCHs is material for the purposes of making a subsequent 
appointment.41 
 
21 It was therefore held that failure to give notice to a distraining landlord did not 
render the appointment of administrators pursuant to paragraph 22 invalid on a 
proper construction of the requirements of paragraph 28. In any event, it was held 
not to be a mandatory requirement to give notice to the persons set out in Rule 
2.20(2), thus non-compliance would not be fatal to the appointment. 
 
An Alternative View: Minmar (929) Ltd v Khalatschi 
 
22 A very different decision was reached by Morritt C less than six months later, in 
Minmar. A director of the company was seeking to challenge the appointment of 
administrators by his fellow directors on a number of grounds, including failure to 
give notice of intention to the company pursuant to Rule 2.20(2)(d).42 In contrast to 
Hill v Stokes, there was no QFCH entitled to notice pursuant to paragraph 26(1). 
                                                 
34 Ibid., at paragraph 41. 
35 Ibid., at paragraph 48. 
36 Ibid., at paragraphs 50-51. 
37 Ibid., at paragraph 52. 
38 Ibid., at paragraphs 53-57. 
39 Ibid., at paragraph 58. 
40 Ibid., at paragraphs 59-60. 
41 Ibid., at paragraphs 61-67. 
42 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 
798, at paragraph 25. 
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23 Immediately prior to the appointment, three non-human directors were 
appointed to the company, with one of the two pre-existing directors suspended on 
grounds of gross misconduct. A directors’ meeting was called, though notice was 
not given to the remaining historic director. The meeting was purported to be 
attended by the three new directors, although in fact only one of these corporate 
directors was represented, the representative declaring it quorate and resolving to 
appoint administrators. 
 
24 Morritt C determined the appointment to be invalid, as the paragraph 22(2) 
power to appoint had not been exercised by the majority of directors in accordance 
with paragraph 105, which did not dispense with the normal rules of internal 
management.43 On the facts, it was clear that the existing directors had been kept in 
the dark over the proposed appointment intentionally, and as a result the company’s 
internal processes, as stipulated by its Articles of Association, had not been 
followed. 
 
25 Had the Chancellor concluded his judgment here, the case would likely have 
been of little significance to the majority of practitioners. However, Morritt C went 
on to consider the requirements of paragraph 26, despite the fact that: 
 
“…the point of law … does not arise, but in case this case goes further.”44 
 
26 The court was not referred to the recent judgment of HHJ McCahill in Hill v 
Stokes, thus the issue was considered afresh. The Chancellor held that the persons 
specified in Rule 2.20(2) were concerned with a proposed appointment whether or 
not there was any QFCH entitled to appoint an administrator or administrative 
receiver.45 It was held to be a standalone requirement to give such persons notice, 
which in the absence of any specified notice period: 
 
“presumably … must be a reasonable period…” 
 
though no guidance was given as to what this would constitute.46 Morritt C chose to 
ignore paragraph 30, and instead: 
 
“follow the clear words of paras 26 and 28”.47 
 
27 As such, failure to give notice to the company itself, pursuant to Rule 
2.20(2)(d), would invalidate the appointment of administrators. 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid., at paragraphs 34-52. 
44 Ibid., at paragraph 53. 
45 Ibid., at paragraph 61. 
46 Ibid., at paragraph 63. 
47 Ibid., at paragraph 66. 
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28 The obiter comments of the Chancellor on the import of Rule 2.20(2) sent hares 
running throughout the insolvency world.48 Not only was such importance attached 
to the giving of notice to these parties that not to do so would invalidate any 
subsequent appointment, but it was also considered necessary to give notice to 
these parties where there was no QFCH entitled to notice pursuant to paragraph 
26(1). This opened a Pandora’s Box and led to a number of cases flooding the 
courts in the following months.49 
 
One Day. Two Cases. More Confusion: The Decisions in Virtualpurple and 
Msaada 
 
29 In the number of cases that followed the Chancellor’s judgment in Minmar, the 
judiciary appeared inclined to adopt a purposive approach and distinguish that case, 
so as to avoid numerous appointments being declared invalid.50 It appeared that a 
degree of certainty had returned post Minmar. This was not to last. The relative 
calm was once more upset by the delivery on 21 December 2011 of two conflicting 
first instance judgments as to the entitlement of the parties in Rule 2.20(2) to notice 
in the absence of a QFCH under paragraph 26(1). The insolvency profession was 
once more in limbo following the decisions handed down by Norris J in 
Virtualpurple and by Warren J in Msaada. 
 
The Decision in Virtualpurple 
 
30 The sole director of the company, which had no QFCHs, resolved in a formally 
minuted meeting to appoint administrators pursuant to paragraph 22(2), having 
taken professional advice. This was achieved by filing Form 2.10B at court, with no 
notice of intention to appoint served on any of the parties in Rule 2.20(2). Norris J 
held, that on proper construction of the provisions of Schedule B1, there was no 
need to give notice of the intended appointment to the company.51 He went on to 
hold that, even if notice was required, failure to serve it on the company would not 
invalidate the administrators’ appointments.52 
 
                                                 
48 See, for example, D. Gray, “Directors’ Appointment of Administrators — to serve or not to serve?” 
(2011) 4 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 135 and M. Weaver, “Administration – The Plot thickens” 
(2012) 1 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 7. In the latter, the decision is described as having 
“produced sleepless nights for directors, administrators and their lawyers alike.” 
49 See, for example, Re Derfshaw Ltd and others [2011] EWHC 1565 (Ch); Re Care Matters 
Partnership Ltd [2011] EWHC 2543 (Ch); [2012] 2 BCLC 311; Re Frontsouth (Witham) Ltd, Re 
Bridge Hospital (Witham) Ltd [2011] EWHC 1668 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 818; Re Assured Logistics 
Solutions Ltd; Re Taurus Bathrooms Limited [2011] EWHC 3029 (Ch); [2012] BCC 541; Adjei and 
others v Law For All [2011] EWHC 2672 (Ch); Re Bezier Acquisitions Ltd [2011] EWHC 3299 (Ch); 
[2012] 2 BCLC 322. 
50 See, for example, the decision in Re Bezier Acquisitions Ltd [2011] EWHC 3299 (Ch); [2012] 2 
BCLC 322. 
51 Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at paragraph 23. 
52 Ibid., at paragraph 26. 
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31 In considering the requirements that directors need to comply with when there is 
no QFCH, Norris J did not find the provisions of Schedule B1 to be clear, as the 
Chancellor had in following: 
 
“…the clear words of paras 26 and 28…”53 
 
but rather read them: 
 
“…consistently with other provisions and with an eye on the purpose for which I think they 
were enacted.”54 
 
32 Following the lead of HHJ McCahill in Hill v Stokes, Norris J interpreted the 
reference to paragraph 26 within paragraph 28 as being a reference to paragraph 
26(1). He did this in the context of a comparative analysis of the three methods of 
appointing an administrator pursuant to Schedule B1 and setting out eight 
supporting reasons: 55 
 
1. A strict construction of paragraph 30 suggests the draftsman envisaged two scenarios: 
one where notice of intention be given to a QFCH, and another where no such notice is 
required. 
2. That no persons are specified in paragraph 26, other than in paragraph 26(1), suggests 
that the reference to paragraph 26 in Rule 2.20(2) is in fact to paragraph 26(1); 
3. The prescribed form 2.8B is only suitable for giving notice to a QFCH; 
4. Rule 2.20(2) only requires a “copy” of the notice to be given to those parties, in 
addition to the persons specified in paragraph 26; 
5. If the directors are always required to give notice to the company, then the Form 2.10B 
(entitled “Notice of appointment of an administrator by company or director(s) 
(where a notice of intention to appoint has not been issued)”) is wrongly headed, as it 
applies where no notice of intention is given; 
6. The statutory declaration in the Form 2.10B is ineffective for a director’s appointment 
where notice of intention to appoint needs to have been given; 
7. The Form 2.8B cannot sensibly be completed other than if addressed to QFCHs; and 
8. The decision in Minmar ignores the significance of the interim moratorium and why 
notice of it needs to be given to the parties listed in Rule 2.20(2). 
 
33 Norris J went on to distinguish the decision in Minmar, in that there was no 
evidence in the instant case of a division between directors and shareholders nor 
was there any doubt as to the authority of the directors to act on behalf of the 
company.56 
 
34 Reading the judgment handed down by Norris J in Virtualpurple, many 
practitioners would no doubt have breathed a sigh of relief at the apparent 
                                                 
53 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 
798, at paragraph 66. 
54 Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at paragraph 21. 
55 Ibid., at paragraphs 11-22. The three modes of appointment being: by court order pursuant to 
paragraph 12, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986; out-of-court by a qualifying floating charge holder 
pursuant to paragraph 14; and out-of-court by the company or its directors pursuant to paragraph 22. 
56 Ibid., at paragraph 27. 
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continuation of purposive judicial interpretation. This sense of calm would not have 
lasted long, however, once the impact of Warren J’s verdict in Msaada was 
digested. 
 
The Decision in Msaada 
 
35 Although concerning a very different set of facts, Msaada touched upon the 
issues at the heart of the debate following the decision of the Chancellor in 
Minmar. The case involved an insolvent partnership which appointed 
administrators out-of-court pursuant to paragraph 22 (as it applies to partnerships 
under the Insolvent Partnerships Order 199457 (“IPO”)). For partnerships, the 
provisions of paragraph 14 are only available to agricultural floating charge 
holders,58 of which there were none in this case. Accordingly, the partners did not 
give notice of their intention to appoint administrators to any parties, as they did 
not consider the amended provisions of paragraph 26 to be engaged under 
paragraph 30.59 
 
36 The Rules apply equally to insolvent partnerships, with: 
 
“…such modifications as the context requires for the purpose of giving effect to the 
provisions of the [Insolvency] Act [1986].”60 
 
37 At the time of the appointment, the partnership was subject to a Partnership 
Voluntary Arrangement (“PVA”) pursuant to the IPO.61 The partners’ appointment 
of administrators was challenged by the partnership’s secured creditor, for want of 
notice of the intention to appoint being given to the supervisors of the PVA 
pursuant to Rule 2.20(2)(c), as amended.62 The secured creditor was unhappy with 
the partnership’s choice of administrator, and wanted its own, more experienced, 
nominee appointed by the court. Warren J had to decide, therefore, whether the 
supervisors of the PVA should have been given notice of the proposed appointment 
and, if so, the impact of the failure to do so.63 
 
38 The court concluded that, even in the absence of a QFCH, notice should have 
been given to the PVA supervisors, with failure to do so invalidating the 
appointment. Rather than making a retrospective appointment of the partners’ 
chosen administrator, the secured creditor’s nominee was appointed 
                                                 
57 The Insolvent Partnerships Order 1994 (SI 1994/2421) as amended by the Insolvent Partnerships 
(Amendment) Order 2005 (SI 2005/1516). 
58 Ibid., paragraph 7, Schedule 2. 
59 Ibid., paragraph 11, Schedule 2. 
60 Ibid., paragraph 18 and Schedule 10. 
61 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
62 Rule 2.20(2)(c), Insolvency Rules 1986, as amended by paragraph 18 and Schedule 10, The Insolvent 
Partnerships Order 1994. 
63 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraph 17. 
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prospectively.64 In reaching his conclusion, Warren J considered the judgments of 
HHJ McCahill in Hill v Stokes and Morritt C in Minmar, finding: 
 
“…[i]n concurrence with the reasoning of the Chancellor, it is then right to follow the clear 
words of paragraphs 26 and 28 so that the latter is not to be read down as referring only to 
paragraph 26(1).”65 
 
39 The judgment was therefore at odds with that of Norris J in Virtualpurple.  
 
40 Somewhat strangely, considerable weight appears to be given to the views of the 
secured creditor. Had this case concerned a company, it is inconceivable that the 
secured creditor in question would not have taken a floating charge over the 
borrower’s assets, such was the extent and importance of its funding. However, as it 
was lending to a partnership, this was not possible. Perhaps as a consequence, 
Warren J appears to elevate the status of the fixed-charge creditor to that of a 
floating charge holder. In part of his judgment, Warren J holds that notice of the 
intended appointment should have been given to the PVA supervisors, as they may 
have informed the secured creditors, who in turn could have made an 
administration application before the partners completed their appointment.66 
 
41 Whilst this turn of events may well have occurred had the secured creditor 
received such indirect notice, the rationale goes beyond the provisions of Rule 
2.20(2). The secured lender would have been interested in the partnership’s choice 
of administrators irrespective of whether it was subject to a PVA, as any 
appointment would have a bearing on realisations under its security. However, had 
there not been a PVA, the secured lender would not have received the notice 
alluded to by Warren J. The secured creditor’s position should not change because 
of the PVA, as this is not provided for in the Act or the Rules. The decision, in at 
least part, therefore appears to be founded upon uncertain legal grounds. 
 
The Fallout from Virtualpurple and Msaada 
 
42 The conflicting judgments of Norris J and Warren J caused much uncertainty 
and evermore caution amongst insolvency practitioners. With no clear guidance, 
there were two apparent choices when making an administration appointment: 
firstly, to serve notice of intention to appoint in Form 2.8B on any parties detailed 
in Rule 2.20(2), even in the absence of a QFCH; or secondly, to seek court 
appointment. The first approach was not without risk, given the decision of Hart J 
in Re G-Tech Construction Ltd,67 whilst the latter was deemed by Mann J to be 
                                                 
64 Ibid., at paragraphs 61 and 97. 
65 Ibid., at paragraph 62. 
66 Ibid., at paragraph 53. 
67 [2007] BPIR 1275 (Ch D). Hart J held that using the incorrect prescribed form led to an invalid 
appointment. Mann J’s judgment in Re MF Global Overseas Ltd (in administration), Re MF Global 
Finance Europe Ltd (in administration) [2012] EWHC 1091 (Ch) did offer some respite from this. 
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“very unfortunate”,68 given the purpose of the Enterprise Act 2002 reforms to make 
administration more accessible and streamlined.69 
 
43 A semblance of order was restored following the judgment in Re BXL Services70 
in July 2012. HHJ Purle found himself bound, pursuant to the Colchester Estates71 
principle, by the recent decision of Arnold J in Re Ceart Risk Services.72 
Accordingly, HHJ Purle held that: 
 
“… it seems to me that I should regard the law as now settled at first instance: the failure to 
give notice of an intended appointment to one of the parties prescribed under paragraph 
26(2) of Schedule B1 does not invalidate the appointment, even assuming that such notice 
is required.”73 
 
The Judicial Divide: Hill v Stokes and Virtualpurple versus Minmar and Msaada 
 
44 The four key judgments considered above differ on the entitlement of the parties 
in Rule 2.20(2) to notice in the absence of a QFCH under paragraph 26(1). 
Essentially, HHJ McCahill in Hill v Stokes and Norris J in Virtualpurple held that it 
is only necessary to give notice to these additionally prescribed persons if there is a 
QFCH being given notice under paragraph 26(1). This, it was held, is supported by 
the wording of paragraphs 28(1)(a)-(b) and 30, and that the reference in the 
opening line of paragraph 28 to “paragraphs 26 and 27”, should in fact be read as 
to “paragraphs 26(1) and 27”.74 
 
45 Quite a different position is reached by Morritt C in Minmar and Warren J 
Msaada, both following the: 
 
“…clear words of paragraphs 26 and 28 [Schedule B1]…” 
 
                                                 
68 Re MF Global Overseas Ltd (in administration), Re MF Global Finance Europe Ltd (in 
administration) [2012] EWHC 1091 (Ch), at paragraph 16. 
69 HC Deb 10 April 2002, vol 383, cols 44-115. See the comments of the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Miss Melanie Johnson, at col 114 where she says, inter alia, 
“I reassure the House that the intention in company insolvencies is to disengage from active 
involvement of the courts, except in cases where there is dispute or complexity.” 
70 [2012] EWHC 1877 (Ch). 
71 Colchester Estates (Cardiff) v Carlton Industries plc [1984] 2 All ER 601. 
72 Re Ceart Risk Services Ltd; Bootes and others v Ceart Risk Services Ltd [2012] EWHC 1178 (Ch). 
73 Re BXL Services [2012] EWHC 1877 (Ch), at paragraphs 11 and 13. 
74 Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company [2010] EWHC 3726 
(Ch), at paragraph 48; Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at 
paragraph 22. 
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in holding that the parties set out in Rule 2.20(2) are entitled to notice of the 
company or directors’ intention to appoint administrators, irrespective of whether 
there is a QFCH to be given notice under paragraph 26(1).75 
 
46 In order to resolve the issue as to whether and when the parties set out in Rule 
2.20(2) need to be given notice of the intention to appoint administrators, it is 
necessary to consider the conflict between the judgments on either side of the 
debate. Both sides make valid points, but the decisions all leave a number of key 
issues unanswered. A simpler solution, however, appears to have been dismissed, 
with no clear rationale. 
 
 
Problems with the Judicial Interpretation 
 
47 The judgment of HHJ Purle in Re BXL Services has been widely welcomed 
throughout the insolvency profession, seen by many as drawing a line under the 
hitherto thorny issue of service pursuant to Rule 2.20(2), and in particular service 
on the company.76 Whilst the decision must be welcomed in the short term for 
providing much-needed relief in the out-of-court appointment process, it is not the 
panacea that is needed. The line of judgments from Hill v Stokes through Minmar 
to Re BXL Services by and large considered two key questions: firstly, to whom 
must notice of the directors’ intention to appoint administrators be given; and 
secondly, what is the impact of not giving notice to such a person. Only the second 
of these matters has been settled at first instance. Whilst it is now clear that a defect 
in the giving of notice of intention of an appointment can be rectified without 
recourse to the limited remedy of a “G-Tech Order”,77 it has yet to be resolved 
when Rule 2.20(2) requires notice to be given.78 Doubt therefore remains as to the 
operation of Rule 2.20(2). Does it apply independently in the absence of a QFCH, 
or is it dependent on a notice of intention to appoint having been given under 
paragraph 26(1)? 
 
                                                 
75 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 
798, at paragraphs 61-66; National Westminster Bank plc v (1) Msaada Group (a firm) [2011] EWHC 
3423 (Ch), at paragraph 62. 
76 See, for example, <www.linklaters.com/Publications/Director-appointments-of-administrators-return-
to-pragmatism/Pages/index.aspx> and <www.kennedys-
law.com/article/outofcourtadministrationappointments> (both last viewed 30 November 2014). 
77 So called following the judgment of Hart J in Re G-Tech Construction Ltd [2007] BPIR 1275 (Ch 
D). The order could only be made retrospectively for up to 364 days, to avoid its automatic expiry for 
effluxion of time. Following the decision of Norris J in Re Care Matters Partnership Ltd [2011] 
EWHC 2543 (Ch), such an order could only be made if the purpose of administration was still 
achievable at the date of the subsequent application. 
78 Failure to give notice of intention to appoint could be a remediable defect capable of curing by the 
court pursuant to rule 7.55 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, whilst any acts of the administrators could be 
validated by paragraph 104, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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The True Nature of Rule 2.20(2) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 
 
48 In his lengthy and detailed judgment in Msaada, Warren J makes a valid critique 
of HHJ McCahill’s interpretation in Hill v Stokes of paragraph 28, where he read 
reference to paragraph 26 as being to paragraph 26(1).79 To do as HHJ McCahill 
suggests would make it: 
 
“…impossible, without primary legislation, ever to prescribe a person or notice under 
paragraph 26(2) having the consequence that non-compliance would lead to invalidity of 
any appointment.”80 
 
49 HHJ McCahill’s suggestion essentially devoids paragraph 26(2) of any purpose. 
Consider, for example, if secondary legislation prescribed that, pursuant to 
paragraph 26(2), all fixed charge holders be given five business days’ notice of the 
intention of the company or directors to appoint administrators out-of-court. On 
HHJ McCahill’s construction, failure to give this notice would not invalidate the 
subsequent appointment, as it would if notice were not given to a QFCH. Whilst 
there is no doubt an argument that there may be drafting errors in Schedule B1 
given the manner in which it was rushed through Parliament,81 it is highly unlikely 
that Parliament would have intended to disable itself in such a way. This is an 
entirely appropriate and valid point by Warren J, which points to a solution, 
apparently readily dismissed by all sides. 
 
50 Paragraph 26(2) provides that the company or directors making an out-of-court 
administration appointment: 
 
“…shall also give such notice as may be prescribed to such other persons as may be 
prescribed.”82 
 
51 Adopting the approach of the Chancellor and Warren J, and looking at the clear 
words of the statute, this is a conjunctive requirement: the additional prescribed 
persons must be given notice in a form prescribed for that purpose. Arguably, it 
would not be possible to stipulate a person for the purpose of paragraph 26(2), 
without also stipulating the form of such notice. Therefore, for Rule 2.20(2) to 
                                                 
79 Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company [2010] EWHC 3726 
(Ch), at paragraphs 35-36. 
80 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraph 33. 
81 There was no provision for an out-of-court appointment process in the White Paper Insolvency – A 
Second Chance 2001 (Cm 5234) and it appears that a number of MPs were not aware of its 
introduction at the second reading of the Enterprise Bill, See, for example, HC Deb 10 April 2002 vol 
383 cols 44-115 and the comments of Mr John Whittingdale at col 58, Mr David Ruffley at col 82 and 
Mr Jonathan Djanogly at col 101. There was also concern at the speed at which the Bill was been 
forced through, as seen in the complaints of Mr John Whittingdale at col 53 that there had been a “lack 
of real consultation” and “little opportunity for detailed scrutiny and debate” of such a complex Bill. 
82 Paragraph 26(2), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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prescribe persons to be given notice pursuant to paragraph 26(2), there must be a 
related form for serving notice on them. 
 
52 Beyond the provisions of Schedule B1, the procedural aspects of the 
appointment of an administrator by a company or its directors are set out in Chapter 
4 of Part 2 of the Rules. Rules 2.20-2.22 deal with notices of intention to appoint, 
whilst the remainder of Chapter 4, Rules 2.23-2.26, relate to the subsequent notice 
of appointment.83 Rules 2.21 and 2.22 cover the timing of the statutory declaration 
and evidence of authority.84 It is therefore important to consider the provisions of 
Rule 2.20 as a whole, which provide: 
 
“2.20 Notice of intention to appoint 
2.20(1) [Form of notice] The notice of intention to appoint an administrator for the 
purposes of paragraph 26 shall be in Form 2.8B. 
2.20(2) [Copy of notice to be sent to] A copy of the notice of intention to appoint must, 
in addition to the persons specified in paragraph 26, be given to–  
(a) any enforcement officer who, to the knowledge of the person giving the 
notice, is charged with execution or other legal process against the 
company; 
(b) any person who, to the knowledge of the person giving the notice, has 
distrained against the company or its property; 
(c) any supervisor of a voluntary arrangement under Part I of the Act; and 
(d) the company, if the company is not intending to make the appointment. 
2.20(3) [Application of r.2.8(2)-(5) to notice] The provisions of Rule 2.8(2) to 2.8(5) 
shall apply to the sending or giving of notice under this Rule as they apply to the 
manner  in which service of an administration application is effected under 
that Rule.”85 
 
53 Form 2.8B, entitled “Notice of intention to appoint an administrator by 
company or director(s)”, is the only form prescribed by the Rules for the giving of 
notice of intention to appoint administrators. Thus, if Rule 2.20(2) is to be 
prescribing for the purposes of paragraph 26(2), then Form 2.8B must be suitable 
for serving on these parties. It is, however, readily apparent on viewing Form 2.8B, 
that this is not designed for the giving of notice to any person other than a QFCH 
pursuant to paragraph 26(1) Schedule B1. The second paragraph of the form states: 
 
“This notice is being given to the following person(s), being person(s) who is / are or may be 
entitled to appoint an administrative receiver of the company or an administrator of the 
company under paragraph 14 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986”  86 
 
54 This is the only part of Form 2.8B in which it is possible to set out the details of 
any party on whom the form is to be served. Based on the contents of the form, it 
cannot be used to give notice of intention to appoint an administrator unless there 
                                                 
83 Rules 2.20-2.26, Insolvency Rules 1986. 
84 Ibid., rules 2.21-2.22. 
85 Ibid., rule 2.20(2). 
86 Ibid., Schedule 4, available at: <www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/forms/2-8b.pdf> (last viewed 30 
November 2014). 
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exists a QFCH. Even then, it would not be possible to set out the details of any of 
the persons in Rule 2.20(2) within the Form 2.8B. There are only two other forms 
prescribed for appointments made pursuant to paragraph 22; Form 2.9B (entitled 
“Notice of appointment of an administrator by company or director(s) (where a 
notice of intention to appoint has been issued)”) and Form 2.10B (entitled “Notice 
of appointment of an administrator by company or director(s) (where a notice of 
intention to appoint has not been issued)”).87 These are both for the actual 
appointment of administrators by a company or its directors, and are clearly not 
suitable for giving notice of the intention to appoint, a fact acknowledged by the 
Chancellor in Minmar, who was: 
 
“…unable to reconcile the inconsistency.”88 
 
55 Evaluation of the various prescribed forms makes it clear that none is suitable 
for giving of notice to the parties in Rule 2.20(2). Warren J was of the view that: 
 
“…the prescribed Forms for companies, and indeed the terms of Rule 2.20(2) also, are not 
relevant to the construction of Schedule B1.”89 
 
56 In making this statement, Warren J was referring to HHJ McCahill’s 
interpretation of paragraph 28, and no doubt he is correct that secondary legislation 
should not be used to rewrite primary legislation. However, it cannot be doubted 
that by reviewing the prescribed forms alongside the Rules, we can ascertain 
whether the basic requirements of the statute have been met in order for Rule 
2.20(2) to be considered prescribing. 
 
57 It is notable that Rule 2.20(1), which prescribes the only form to be used to 
notice of intention to appoint, was introduced contemporaneously with Rule 
2.20(2),90 and neither has been amended since. Had the Secretary of State intended 
Rule 2.20(2) to prescribe persons for the purpose of paragraph 26(2), one would 
have imagined that care would have been taken to ensure the prescribed form being 
introduced was appropriate for the purpose, or that a further form would have been 
introduced then or subsequently. That there is no appropriate prescribed form for 
giving notice to the persons in Rule 2.20(2) further suggests that these are not 
persons prescribed for the purpose of paragraph 26(2). Rather, these persons should 
receive a copy of the notice being given to any QFCH, as per the clear words of 
Rule 2.20(2). This will be explored further below. 
 
                                                 
87 Ibid., Schedule 4, available at: <www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/forms/2-9b.pdf> and 
<www.insolvency.gov.uk/pdfs/forms/2-10b.pdf> (both last viewed 30 November 2014). 
88 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 
798, at paragraphs 65-66. 
89 National Westminster Bank plc v (1) Msaada Group (a firm) [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at paragraph 
38. 
90 Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003 (SI 2003/1730). 
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58 This view is further supported by consideration of Form 2.10B. Introduced by 
Rule 2.23(1) at the same time as Form 2.8B, Form 2.10B is entitled “Notice of 
appointment of an administrator by company or director(s) (where a notice of 
intention to appoint has not been issued)”, and makes provision for administrators 
to be appointed by both company and directors, without any prior notice of the 
intention to appoint being given. As was rightly pointed out by Norris J in 
Virtualpurple, if the directors are bound to give the company notice of their 
intention to appoint administrators pursuant to Rule 2.20(2)(d) even in the absence 
of any QFCH (or indeed any other person prescribed for the purpose of paragraph 
26(2)), it would never be possible for a company director to use Form 2.10B.91 It is 
apparent throughout this form that it is intended to be used by both company and 
directors. Such a form would not be suitable, had the draftsman of the Rules 
intended directors to give notice of intention to appoint to the company in all 
situations. 
 
Judicial Comity and the Acceptance of Rule 2.20(2) as a Prescribing Provision 
 
59 Interestingly, in dismissing HHJ McCahill’s rationale in Hill v Stokes, Warren J 
states that: 
 
“…[t]he Form itself therefore provides no basis for saying that the persons specified in Rule 
2.20(2) are not the persons who are prescribed in those circumstances for the purposes of 
paragraph 26(2).”92 
 
60 Whilst this is arguably incorrect, HHJ McCahill does not make such a 
suggestion anywhere in his judgment; in fact he quite clearly dismisses the notion 
as raised by the directors’ solicitors.93 It is therefore worthwhile considering why, 
in light of the strong counter-indications set out above, the courts have seemingly 
accepted that Rule 2.20(2) is a prescribing provision for the purpose of paragraph 
26(2). 
 
61 In his appraisal of the provisions of Schedule B1 and the Rules in Hill v Stokes, 
HHJ McCahill opines that: 
 
“…if persons have been prescribed for the purposes of paragraph 26(2) of schedule B1, one 
finds them nowhere else than in paragraph 2.20.”94 
 
62 Arguably this is accurate; there is no other secondary legislation presently 
enacted which could be considered to prescribe persons for the purpose of 
                                                 
91 Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at paragraph 22(f). 
92 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraph 39. 
93 Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company [2010] EWHC 3726 
(Ch), at paragraphs 40-43. 
94 Ibid., at paragraph 29. 
  Umfreville: Out of Court Administration Appointment Reform 145 
paragraph 26(2). This does not by itself indicate that Rule 2.20(2) fulfils this 
purpose. Ultimately, Rule 2.20(2) fails to do so in the absence of a suitable 
prescribed form. The judgment, however, goes on to dismiss the suggestion by the 
directors’ solicitors that: 
 
“…on its proper construction rule 2.20 does not purport to identify or prescribe anyone for 
the purposes of 26(2) in schedule B1.”95 
 
63 The rationale for this dismissal appears to be that: 
 





“…everybody has proceeded upon the basis … that 2.20(2) is the prescribing process for 
paragraph 26(2) in schedule B1.”96 
 
64 Such dismissal lacks robustness. Perhaps the submission did not emphasise the 
key point, for it is the lack of appropriate prescribed form which is key, and appears 
from the judgment to have been overlooked. That Rule 2.20(2) does not engage 
paragraph 26 seems readily more plausible than the suggestion that Rule 2.20(2) 
also suffered from the draftsman’s laxity, as reference to paragraph 26 should again 
be read as paragraph 26(1).97 If one is to read the introductory words of Rule 
2.20(2), the reference to “the person specified in paragraph 26” would encompass 
both paragraphs 26(1) and 26(2).98 The use of the singular is not, as suggested by 
HHJ McCahill, indicative of the intention only to refer to paragraph 26(1), given 
there could be multiple QFCHs caught by this provision alone. 
 
65 The same conclusion is reached by Morritt C in Minmar and Norris J in 
Virtualpurple, though again the rationale is debatable. Having set out the 
provisions of each of the paragraphs of Rule 2.20, the Chancellor concludes: 
 
“…[t]hus r 2.20(2) is the provision to which para 26(2) referred and reading the two 
together requires notice of an intention to appoint an administrator to be given to the 
company itself.”99 
 
66 Similarly, in Virtualpurple, having considered the provisions of paragraph 26 
and the contents of Form 2.8B as prescribed by Rule 2.20(1), Norris J addresses the 
provisions of paragraph 26(2), concluding that: 
                                                 
95 Ibid., at paragraphs 40-41. 
96 Ibid., at paragraph 41. 
97 Ibid., at paragraph 42. 
98 Rule 2.20(2), Insolvency Rules 1986. 
99 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 BCLC 
798, at paragraphs 56-57. 
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“…[t]hose other persons [referred to in paragraph 26(2) Schedule B1] are set out in IR 
2.20(2).”100 
 
67 It is accepted that Rule 2.20(2) is a prescribing provision for paragraph 26(2) 
despite the acknowledgment that there is no notice period and that Form 2.8B is not 
suitable for giving notice to those persons.101 As with the decision in Hill v Stokes, 
there appears to be an assumption that somebody must have been prescribed for the 
purpose of paragraph 26(2), and as only Rule 2.20(2) provides a possible solution, 
it has been readily accepted as such. 
 
68 The suggestion that Rule 2.20(2) is not a prescribing provision is raised once 
again by counsel for the defence in Msaada, in arguing that those persons do not 
require service pursuant to paragraph 26(2).102 The suggestion is once again 
rejected, on a number of grounds, though again the rationale appears to be 
questionable. Firstly, Warren J found that according to section 251 of the Act, 
“prescribed” means prescribed by the rules made in accordance with section 411 of 
the Act, being substantially the Rules, and as such: 
 
“…Rule 2.20(2) can therefore be seen prescribing persons and purposes for the purposes of 
paragraph 26.”103 
 
69 Undoubtedly the quoted statutory provisions make it possible for Rule 2.20(2) 
to prescribe persons for the purpose of paragraph 26(2), but as drafted it fails to do 
so, given the lack of appropriate prescribed form. Warren J goes on to suggest that: 
 
“…unless Rule 2.20(2) is seen as engaging paragraph 26, it is not easy to see what power 
there is to require service of a notice of intention on anyone.”104 
 
70 The argument appears to be that, if Rule 2.20(2) does not apply pursuant to 
paragraph 26(2), then it is of no effect generally in requiring notice to be given to 
those parties. It should once again be noted that Rule 2.20(2) only requires a 
“copy” of the notice of intention to appoint to be given to those parties,105 which is 
distinguishable from a notice itself, as will be discussed below. Warren J concludes 
that such notice must be set forth in Form 2.8B, as prescribed by Rule 2.20(1),106 
apparently ignoring the fact that Form 2.8B is inadequate for such purpose. 
 
                                                 
100 Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at paragraphs 4-6. 
101 Ibid., at paragraphs 6 and 23(g). 
102 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraph 46. 
103 Idem. 
104 Ibid., at paragraph 47. 
105 Rule 2.20(2), Insolvency Rules 1986. 
106 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraphs 48-51. 
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71 Whilst the courts on both sides of the divide appear routinely to have accepted 
that Rule 2.20(2) is a prescribing provision for paragraph 26(2), it would appear 
that the rationale for doing so is not clear cut, and certainly is not convincing. 
Paragraph 26(2) clearly states that both further person and notice may be 
prescribed.107 Given that the prescribed form introduced contemporaneously with 
Rule 2.20(2) is not suitable for giving notice to those persons, especially where 
there is no QFCH pursuant to paragraph 26(1), the basic requirements of paragraph 
26(2) do not appear to have been fulfilled. 
 
Dispelling the Myth: Further Evidence that Rule 2.20(2) does not engage 
Paragraph 26(2) 
 
72 Closer inspection of both the provisions of Schedule B1 and the Rules reveals 
further evidence that Rule 2.20(2) does not, nor was it intended to, act as a 
prescribing instrument pursuant to paragraph 26(2). Many of these issues have been 
considered by the courts, though not from the perspective of whether Rule 2.20(2) 
is a prescribing provision. When re-addressed from this perspective, the arguments 
and counter-arguments raised across the divide of opinion would appear to fall 
away. 
 
Choice of Language 
 
73 Once more following the approach of the Chancellor in Minmar, and 
concentrating on the clear words of the legislation, it is possible to distinguish the 
nature of service on those persons in Rule 2.20(2) from that required by paragraph 
26. The Rule commences with: 
 
“A copy of the notice of intention to appoint must, in addition to the persons specified in 
paragraph 26, be given to...”108 
 
74 The choice of language appears to be telling. Firstly, the Rule relates to the 
service of a copy notice. For a copy to exist, there must be an original notice that 
requires service. This would appear to be the notice generated under paragraph 26, 
whether it be 26(1) or 26(2), given the use of the words: 
 
“…in addition to those persons specified in paragraph 26.” 
 
75 Indeed, if Rule 2.20(2) was to be a prescribing provision for paragraph 26(2), 
this language would prove circular – the persons listed would, in effect, be in 
addition to themselves.  
 
                                                 
107 Paragraph 26(2), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
108 Rule 2.20(2), Insolvency Rules 1986. 
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76 This literal interpretation was rejected, somewhat tenuously, in Msaada, with 
Warren J contending that: 
 





“…[e]ach piece of paper is both a “copy” of the notice of intention to appoint for the 
purposes of Rule 2.20(2) and a notice in the prescribed form for the purposes of paragraph 
26(1) and (2).”109 
 
77 Whilst there is arguably a certain logic to this approach – there may be many 
“copies” of the notice – it does not sit well within the broader context of the 
interaction, or lack thereof, of Rule 2.20(2) with paragraph 26(2) and the provision 
within the prescribed Form 2.8B. Indeed, given that the parties in Rule 2.20(2) 
cannot be detailed within Form 2.8B, surely they can only be given a copy of that 
form generated for service on the parties in paragraph 26(1). Warren J even goes on 
to say that: 
 
“…were it not for the presence of the words “in addition to…” it would be clear, in my 
view, that Rule 2.20(2) was prescribing the listed persons for the purposes of paragraph 
26(2).”110 
 
78 However, the inclusion of these words is significant, and in trying to counter 
their meaning Warren J apparently rewrites the Rule, reading the reference to 
paragraph 26 as paragraph 26(1).111 There is no clear explanation for this approach, 
which is contrary to his rejection of HHJ McCahill’s similar approach to paragraph 
28.112 
 
79 The distinct meaning of the word “copy” in Rule 2.20(2) is further illustrated 
when compared to the provisions for service of a court application for an 
appointment pursuant to paragraph 12. The parties to be notified of an 
administration application are set out in paragraphs 12(2)(a)-(c), with paragraph 
12(2)(d) allowing for further persons to be prescribed.113 Such additional parties 
are prescribed in Rule 2.6(3), which begins: 
 
“…[t]he application shall be served in addition to those persons referred to in paragraph 
12(2)…” 
 
                                                 
109 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraph 50. 
110 Ibid., at paragraph 51. 
111 Idem. 
112 Ibid., at paragraph 41. 
113 Paragraph 12(2), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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going on to list various additional parties.114 Notably, this rule does not refer to a 
“copy” of the application being served; a stark contrast to the language adopted in 
Rule 2.20(2). The adoption of the word “copy” in Rule 2.20(2) distinguishes the 
type of service required on those parties when compared to the parties in Rule 
2.6(3), and therefore also those parties set out in paragraph 26. 
 
80 The language of Rule 2.6(3) does present a challenge to this argument, however. 
The use of the words: 
 
“…in addition to those persons referred to in paragraph 12(2)…” 
 
does create an air of circularity, as considered in respect of Rule 2.20(2) above, 
given it includes paragraph 12(2)(d), for which this rule is prescribing. This could, 
however, be a consequence of the number of additional sub-paragraphs in 
paragraph 12(2), which already prescribes three distinct groups, in contrast to 
paragraph 26 which only prescribes one distinct group; the QFCHs. In any event, 
the use of the word “copy” only in Rule 2.20(2) would appear to be of more 
significance, especially when considered in the context of the contents of Form 
2.8B. 
 
Purpose of Giving Notice 
 
81 If the rationale for the giving of notice of intention to appoint an administrator is 
considered, there is no clear reason for giving such notice to the persons set out in 
Rule 2.20(2) in the absence of a QFCH under paragraph 26(1). Any person with the 
power to appoint an administrative receiver or administrator pursuant to a 
qualifying floating charge has, by necessity, a security interest that sets it apart from 
the majority of other creditors and interested parties. This right gives rise to the 
power to appoint an administrator over a company, even where the company or its 
directors wish to do so themselves. The filing of a notice of intention to appoint 
administrators by a company or its directors instigates an interim moratorium, 
whereby no insolvency proceedings or other legal process may be commenced 
without leave of the court.115 Excepted from this interim moratorium is the right to 
appoint an administrator pursuant to paragraph 14 or an administrative receiver.116 
There is therefore clear justification for giving notice of an intended appointment to 
QFCHs. The same cannot be said for those parties set out in Rule 2.20(2). 
 
82 Any duly charged enforcement officer, distrainer or supervisor of a voluntary 
arrangement117 is not directly entitled to appoint an administrator over a company, 
but must make an application to court pursuant to paragraph 12. The right of such 
                                                 
114 Rule 2.6(3), Insolvency Rules 1986. 
115 Paragraphs 42-44, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
116 Ibid., at paragraph 44(7). 
117 Rule 2.20(2)(a)-(c), Insolvency Rules 1986. 
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parties is not accorded special consideration by the interim moratorium provisions, 
as is the case for QFCHs, thus they would need leave of court to make such an 
application during an interim moratorium.118 These parties are therefore treated no 
differently to the company’s common creditors, who are not entitled to any form of 
notice. Why, then, should the parties under Rule 2.20(2) be entitled to any notice at 
all? This question is addressed sensibly by HHJ McCahill in Hill v Stokes. As 
considered above, QFCHs: 
 
“…must be notified because of their power, as it were, to trump the proposal and put in their 
own preferred administrator.”119 
 
83 On the other hand, he opines that service on those persons in Rule 2.20(2): 
 
“…may be to prevent them from inadvertently interfering with the interim moratorium.”120 
 
84 The purpose of giving a “copy” of the notice of intention to appoint 
administrators is, as Norris J considered in Virtualpurple, to notify: 
 
“…those whose rights are immediately affected by a temporary suspension.”121 
 
85 It would not be possible to give notice to all creditors who could exercise such 
rights, whereas those actively enforcing recovery rights around the time of the 
proposed appointment, together with the company which could pass a winding up 
resolution, could easily be identified and notified. Indeed, the obligation to give 
notice to enforcement officers and distrainers only extends to those of whom the 
appointor has knowledge,122 thus is not exhaustive. 
 
86 It would appear logical that notice of an intention to appoint is given to those 
parties in Rule 2.20(2) to warn of the interim moratorium, and is therefore only 
necessary where notice is being given pursuant to paragraph 26(1) so as to give rise 
to that interim moratorium. This contention is further supported by the prescribed 
notice periods, or lack thereof, for Rule 2.20(2). QFCHs must be given at least five 
business days’ notice. The company or directors are prevented from making an 
administration appointment until this period has either expired, or is waived by 
written consent of the QFCHs.123 This period could be, and often is, reduced to 
naught by the QFCHs consenting immediately. 
 
                                                 
118 Paragraph 4, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
119 Richard John Hill and Jonathan Scott Pope v Stokes Public Limited Company [2010] EWHC 3726 
(Ch), at paragraph 55. 
120 Ibid., at paragraph 56. 
121 Re Virtualpurple Professional Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch), at paragraph 22(h). 
122 Rule 2.20(2)(a)-(b) Insolvency Rules 1986. 
123 Paragraph 28, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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87 What notice, then, must be given to the parties in Rule 2.20(2)? The Rules are 
silent on this point, as is the Act. In addressing this, Morritt C resolved that: 
 
“…[a]s the latter provisions [the Rules] do not specify any notice period, presumably it must 
be a reasonable period.”124 
 
88 In Msaada, Warren J suggests that a reasonable period would be between five 
and ten business days, in accordance with the paragraph 26(1) requirements, even if 
there is no person to serve thereunder.125 It would seem strange that Parliament 
intended a situation whereby a party entitled to make a superior appointment 
without recourse to the courts could consent to a quick appointment being made by 
the company or its directors, only for such an appointment to be held up by parties 
with much lower-ranking (and not enhanced) enforcement rights. 
 
89 The “reasonable period” suggestion also creates problems where there is no 
QFCH to notify, as Warren J acknowledges. His solution is, however, somewhat 
baffling. Firstly, regarding notice on the company, he suggests that the directors 
could accept short notice,126 apparently disregarding the issues arising in Minmar of 
directors acting improperly. With regards to the parties in Rule 2.20(2)(a)-(c), it is 
suggested that a short delay in the appointment in: 
 
“…the minority of cases that there will be persons who need to be given notice under Rule 
2.20(2)…” 
 
would not be incompatible with the statutory objective, but where: 
 
“…matters are really very urgent indeed, an emergency application can be made to the court 
for the appointment of an administrator.”127 
 
90 Such an approach surely goes against Parliament’s intention of reducing the 
burden on the courts by the introduction of the out-of-court appointment process, as 
identified at the second reading of the Enterprise Bill on 10 April 2002128 and in the 
judgment of Collins J in Re Transbus International Ltd.129 Both Morritt C and 
                                                 
124 Minmar (929) Ltd and another v Khalatschi and another [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch); [2012] 1 
BCLC 798, at paragraph 63. 
125 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraphs 59-60. 
126 Ibid., at paragraph 60. 
127 Idem. 
128 HC Deb 10 April 2002 vol 383 cols 44-115. See the comments of the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Miss Melanie Johnson, at col 114 where she says, inter alia, 
“I reassure the House that the intention in company insolvencies is to disengage from active 
involvement of the courts, except in cases where there is dispute or complexity.” 
129 Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch). In particular see the comments of Collins J 
at paragraph 9, where he says “The purpose of the administration provisions, to create a more flexible, 
cheaper and comparatively informal alternative to liquidation, suggested a powerful argument for 
saying that the fewer application (sic) which need to be made to the court the better.” 
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Warren J provide solutions which apparently fail to consider the effect and nature 
of specific provisions of the out-of-court appointment process and the purpose for 
which Schedule B1 was introduced. 
 
91 Guidance as to a sensible approach can be found in the court’s approach to the 
giving of notice by QFCHs pursuant to paragraph 15. In Re OMP Leisure,130 it was 
held not necessary to give notice to a prior-ranking QFCH where the underlying 
debt had been extinguished but the security had not been released, as the prior 
charge holder had no power of appointment to exercise. On the other hand, in Re 
Eco Link Resources131 the prior-ranking QFCH could have exercised the overriding 
power of appointment, and therefore failure to give notice did invalidate the 
purported appointment. The courts have therefore considered the impact on the 
rights extended to others by the Act when determining the requirement to give 
notice, and indeed the impact of not doing so. If similar logic were applied to the 
question of whether or not the parties in Rule 2.20(2) should be served with notice 
of intention to appoint an administrator by the company or directors, irrelevant of 
the presence of an enforceable qualifying floating charge, the answer would surely 
be in the negative, given the lack of enforcement rights bestowed on those parties in 
that situation. 
 
Insolvency Service Guidance 
 
92 The scope of the provisions contained in Rule 2.20(2) can also be understood 
through review of guidance issued by the Insolvency Service.132 Although not 
having any legal standing, nor being approved by Parliament, this can shed light, 
especially on the Rules, given the secondary legislation was drafted by the 
Insolvency Service prior to approval by the Secretary of State. 
 
93 Firstly, the Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise Act 2002133 suggest that a notice 
of intention to appoint administrators need only be filed by the company or its 
directors where there is a QFCH pursuant to paragraph 26(1). In its absence, the 
company or directors must file only a notice of appointment.134 It must, however, 
be borne in mind that the Explanatory Notes were published prior to the publication 
of the Rules. 
 
94 Further insight is available from the Insolvency Service’s regular guidance 
publication, “Dear Insolvency Practitioner”. In October 2010, the Insolvency 
Service provided the following advice in response to queries from practitioners as 
                                                 
130 [2008] BCC 67. 
131 [2012] EWHC (Ch) (unreported). 
132 The Insolvency Service is part of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. formerly the 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
133 Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise Act 2002. 
134 Ibid., at paragraphs 661-663. 
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to when notice of intention to appoint in Form 2.8B was required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 2.20(2): 
 
“It is our view that, when read together, paragraph 26(2) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986, Rule 2.20 and Form 2.8B should be interpreted to mean that paragraph 26(2) 
does not give rise to a standalone requirement to give notice of the intention to appoint an 
administrator. Form 2.8B is not a form that can be completed unless notice of intention to 
appoint is also being given under paragraph 26(1). Rule 2.20(2) requires that specified 
persons must be given a copy of the Form 2.8B notice (given under paragraph 26(1)) and a 
copy of the form cannot be made and given where no original form exists.”135 
 
95 This aligns with the judgments subsequently passed down in Hill v Stokes and 
Virtualpurple, and makes it clear that the body which prepared the Rules did not 
intend for Rule 2.20(2) to require service of notice of intention to appoint in the 
absence of a QFCH. 
 
96 This guidance does, however, cause some confusion. Quite sensibly, the 
Insolvency Service states that Form 2.8B can only be used in conjunction with 
paragraph 26(1). On this basis, there is clearly no form prescribed for serving only 
on those persons listed in Rule 2.20(2) for the purpose of paragraph 26(2). The 
guidance does not, though, state that Rule 2.20(2) does not engage paragraph 26(2), 
but rather uses language suggesting that it does. Given that the requirements of 
paragraph 26(2) are not fulfilled by Rule 2.20(2), as set out above, this confusion 
could be put down to the fact that the guidance note is targeted expressly at 
resolving the issue of when to serve notice under Rule 2.20(2). 
 
 
Attempts at Reform 
 
97 Whilst there would appear to be a strong case to support the contention that 
Rule 2.20(2) is not a prescribing provision for the purposes of paragraph 26(2), 
neither Parliament nor the Government appear to have picked up on this. Rather, 
there are at present suggestions for reform of both Schedule B1 of the Act and 
wholesale reform of the Rules to address the issues raised by the interpretations of 
Rule 2.20(2) and paragraph 26(2). These appear to accept the apparent 
misinterpretation of these provisions, and as a consequence may cause further 
problems. 
 
The Response of Parliament: The Deregulation Bill 
 
98 On 23 January 2014, the Government introduced The Deregulation Bill 2013-14 
to 2014-15 (“the Deregulation Bill”): 
                                                 
135 Dear IP Issue No 47 October 2010, Chapter 1, Article 15, available at: 
<www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/dearip/dearipmill/hardcopy.htm
> (last viewed 30 November 2014). 
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“…to make provision for the reduction of burdens resulting from legislation for businesses 
or other organisations or for individuals; make provision for the repeal of legislation which 
no longer has practical use; make provision about the exercise of regulatory functions; and 
for connected purposes.”136 
 
99 Described as: 
 
“…the Christmas tree Bill to end all Christmas tree Bills…”137 
 
the Deregulation Bill addresses an extremely wide variety of issues, including at 
Part 2 of Schedule 6 provisions relating to the appointment of administrators out-
of-court by a company or its directors. 
 
100 The Deregulation Bill proposes to remove: 
 
“…a requirement in paragraph 26(2) … to give notice of intention to appoint an 
administrator to persons who are not themselves entitled to appoint an administrative 
receiver or administrator.”138 
 
101 The change is deemed necessary on the basis that if the company or its 
directors are intending to appoint an administrator, notice of the intention to 
appoint must be given to the persons set out in Rule 2.20(2), although: 
 
“…unlike those entitled to appoint a receiver or administrator [pursuant to paragraph 14], 
the prescribed persons cannot block the appointment of an administrator.”139 
 
102 As such, it is proposed that paragraph 26(2) will be restyled (with changes 
shown in italics) as: 
 
“26(2) A person who gives notice of intention to appoint under sub-paragraph (1) shall 
also give such notice as may be prescribed to such other persons as may be 
prescribed.”140 
 
103 The most obvious result of this change is that there would clearly be no need to 
give notice to the parties under Rule 2.20(2) if there is no QFCH. Whilst this 
change may at first sight be welcomed, for it clears up the fundamental issue left 
outstanding following the judgment in Re BXL Services, on closer inspection it may 
not be the solution it purports to be. 
 
                                                 
136 Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15. 
137 Deregulation Bill HC Deb 27 February 2014 col 101. See the comments of Chi Onwurah MP. 
138 Explanatory Notes to the Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15, at paragraph 471. 
139 Ibid., at paragraph 472. 
140 Paragraph 26(2), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986, as amended by paragraph 6, Schedule 6, 
Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15. 
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104 The change itself appears to be founded on a level of confusion and does not 
address the issues identified in the Deregulation Bill. The Explanatory Notes state 
that the rationale for the change is that: 
 
“…the prescribed persons cannot block the appointment of an administrator.”141 
 
105 This is of course incorrect, as any creditor could seek to block the appointment 
of an administrator, provided it was aware of the intended appointment.142 Rather, 
the parties in Rule 2.20(2) cannot override the proposed appointment with their 
own nominee, unlike a QFCH. 
 
106 More pertinently, the reform intends to avoid the: 
 
“…unnecessary delays in the administrator’s appointment…” 
 
caused by the: 
 
“…requirement to give notice to these prescribed persons … where there is no one else to 
whom notice of intention to appoint must be given.”143 
 
107 The effect will be that the persons prescribed by Rule 2.20(2) need only be 
given notice where there is a QFCH. Whilst such delay will be avoided where there 
is no QFCH, there could be further delay where there is a QFCH. As discussed in 
paragraphs 81-91 above, a QFCH can consent to an early appointment by the 
company or its directors by giving its written consent pursuant to paragraph 
28(1)(b). Under the proposed reforms, the parties set out in Rule 2.20(2) would 
clearly be entitled to notice under paragraph 26(2) where there is a QFCH (which 
arguably they are not entitled to at present, despite the historic confusion). There is 
not, however, any mechanism by which these other prescribed parties can agree to 
an early appointment, nor any indication as to how much notice must be given. 
 
108 One suggestion to this problem may be that any waiver by a QFCH under 
paragraph 28(1)(b) will automatically be binding on the persons in Rule 2.20(2). 
Were this the case, it would still not allow an almost immediate appointment by the 
company or directors. Pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules, notice of the intention 
to appoint administrators on the Rule 2.20(2) parties will not be deemed to be 
served until the second business day after service.144 Without provision for waiver 
of service by the persons in Rule 2.20(2), in a similar fashion to paragraph 
28(1)(b), the reform will in fact prolong the period between the service of a notice 
of intention to appoint administrators and the subsequent appointment, despite the 
                                                 
141 Explanatory Notes to the Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15, at paragraph 472. 
142 See, for example, DKLL Solicitors v HMRC [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch). 
143 Explanatory Notes to the Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15, at paragraph 473. 
144 CPR 6.14 as applied pursuant to rule 12A.3, Insolvency Rules 1986. 
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acknowledgment by the legislature that these persons have no superior rights that 
should cause delay. 
 
109 Perhaps more worryingly for insolvency practitioners, is that if an appointment 
were to be made under paragraph 22 following consent from the QFCH, but before 
the notice is deemed to have been served on the additional parties, the appointment 
would likely be invalid for failure to properly serve on the prescribed parties. Given 
the clear requirement to give these parties notice as a result of the Deregulation Bill 
reforms, in contrast to the present obligations, the provisions of paragraph 104 and 
Rule 7.55 would not assist the invalidly appointed administrator. Consequently, the 
insolvency practitioner would be faced with an invalid appointment and exposure to 
possible personal liability. 
 
110 The Deregulation Bill has been subject to much scrutiny in both Houses, 
however the proposed changes to paragraph 26(2) to not appear to have been 
considered in any of the Committee Debates before December 2014, with the 
insolvency provisions in Schedule 6 of the Deregulation Bill (Schedule 5 in the 
original Bill) being agreed in the Commons and Lords with no discussion of this 
issue.145 It is of considerable concern that the amendment, which would appear to 
fail to fulfil its objectives, has faced such little scrutiny. Its passage onto the statute 
book could well open a further unwelcome can of worms. 
 
The Response of the Insolvency Service: The Draft Insolvency Rules 2015 
 
111 Prior to the Government’s response, on 26 September 2013, the Insolvency 
Service launched a consultation entitled “Insolvency Rules 1986 – Modernisation 
of the Rules relating to Insolvency Law” (“the Consultation”).146 As the 
Consultation was issued before the Deregulation Bill, its amendments need to be 
considered independently of those proposed changes at this point. The Consultation 
set out proposals for the modernisation and recasting of the Rules, in order to make 
them more user-friendly and reduce red tape facing practitioners. This was to be 
achieved through the proposed Draft Insolvency Rules 2015 (“the Draft Rules”). 
The Draft Rules also contain some technical changes to: 
 
“…make insolvency procedures fairer and more efficient.”147 
 
112 Perhaps unsurprisingly, these changes include measures that seek to: 
 
“…address issues arising from the decision in Minmar (929) Ltd v Khalatschi” 
                                                 
145 Deregulation Bill HC Deb 6 March 2014 col 234 and Deregulation Bill HL Deb 28 October 2014 
col GC396. 
146 “Insolvency Rules 1986 – Modernisation of the Rules relating to Insolvency Law” (The Insolvency 
Service), available at: <www.gov.uk/government/consultations/modernisation-of-the-rules-relating-to-
insolvency-law> (last viewed 30 November 2014). 
147 Ibid., at paragraph 6. 
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regarding the notice requirements for directors when appointing an administrator.148 
 
113 The provisions of Rule 2.20 are recast in rule 3.22 of the Draft Rules, which 
provides: 
 
“Notice of intention to appoint 
3.22  (1) If paragraph 26 of Schedule B1 requires a notice of intention to appoint an 
administrator under paragraph 22 of that Schedule then the notice must—… 
(c) state—… 
(iii) the names and addresses of the persons to whom notice is being given in 
accordance with paragraph 26(1) of Schedule B1;… 
(3) If notice of intention to appoint is given under paragraph 26(1) of Schedule 
B1, notice under paragraph 26(2) must be given in the same terms and at the 
same time to— 
(a) any enforcement officer who, to the knowledge of the person giving the 
notice, is charged with execution or other legal process against the company; 
 (b) any person who, to the knowledge of the person giving the notice, has 
distrained against the company or its property; 
  (c) any supervisor of a CVA; and 
 (d) the company, if the company is not intending to make the appointment.”149 
 
114 According to the explanatory notes accompanying the Consultation, rule 
3.22(3) of the Draft Rules: 
 
“…makes it clear that notice to these persons need only be given in accordance with 





“…the problem of invalid appointments resulting from the judgment in Re Minmar…” 
 
as well as the length of notice.150 
 
115 Whilst these changes may address the issue specifically considered in Minmar, 
they do not address the important wider issue raised by Warren J in Msaada as to 
the purpose of paragraph 26(2).151 Arguably, the reference in rule 3.22(2) of the 
Draft Rules to notice being given to these parties under paragraph 26(2) could be 
interpreted as limiting the ability to introduce further legislation requiring service 
independent of paragraph 26(1). 
 
                                                 
148 Ibid., at paragraph 42. 
149 Rule 3.22, Insolvency Rules 2015 Consultation Draft. 
150 Ibid., Explanatory Notes to Part 3. 
151 National Westminster Bank plc v Msaada Group (a firm) & Ors [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), at 
paragraph 33. 
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116 The drafting of rule 3.22(3) of the Draft Rules makes it clear that the notice to 
be given to these parties is to fall within paragraph 26(2). This would mean that it is 
captured by the subsequent requirements of paragraph 28, whereby the appointment 
cannot be made until the notice has been properly served on all prescribed 
parties.152 This raises the issue, considered in paragraphs 81-91 and paragraphs 98-
118 above, that whilst the QFCH entitled to “trump” the directors’ proposed 
appointment can waive the five business day notice period,153 there is no provision 
for the parties in rule 3.22(3) of the Draft Rules to do likewise. The words: 
 
“…notice under paragraph 26(2) must be given in the same terms and at the same time…” 
 
do not clearly suggest a possible shortening of the notice period.154 As considered 
above, the company’s entry into administration could therefore be delayed due to 
requirement to give notice to a party that has no direct right to interfere in the 
process, or worse still, a purported appointment could be invalid if these notice 
periods were overlooked. 
 
117 An interesting change introduced in the Draft Rules, is the removal of the word 
“copy” from the service on the parties detailed in rule 3.22(3) of the Draft Rules. 
This implies an elevation in the status of these parties, as the Insolvency Service 
itself had previously distinguished the fact that the current regime requires only a 
copy of the notice to be given.155 Whether this is an intentional shift in focus or an 
oversight is not clear, partly due to the fact that the Draft Rules do not prescribe 
any form, but rather set out at length the contents of any notice of intention to 
appoint.156 The terms of paragraph 26 are clear that any notice of intention to 
appoint thereunder must be in the prescribed form,157 and there does not appear to 
be any intention in the Deregulation Bill to change this, indeed the Explanatory 
Notes make reference to filing of the prescribed form.158 
 
118 It would be possible for the “prescribed form” required by paragraph 26 to be 
interpreted as any document containing the prescribed contents set out in the Draft 
Rules. This would, however, be a dangerous path to follow. If a plethora of cases 
can arise as to the validity of an administrator’s appointment where a prescribed 
form has been used, a relaxation so as not to require a standard form would no 
doubt lead to further confusion and, in turn, litigation to establish whether the 
requirements of the Act had been fulfilled. With no prescribed form and further 
                                                 
152 Paragraph 28, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
153 Ibid., at paragraph 28(2). 
154 Rule 3.22(3), Insolvency Rules 2015 Consultation Draft. 
155 Dear IP Issue No 47 October 2010, Chapter 1, Article 15, available at: 
<www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/dearip/dearipmill/hardcopy.htm
> (last viewed 30 November 2014). 
156 Rule 3.22, Insolvency Rules 2015 Consultation Draft. 
157 Paragraphs 26(2)-(3), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
158 Explanatory Notes to the Deregulation Bill 2013-14 to 2014-15, at paragraph 468. 
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confusion as to the interpretation and application of paragraph 26(2), it would 
appear that further work is needed for the Draft Rules to be fit for purpose and for 
the matter of paragraph 26(2) and its application to be settled. 
 
Interaction of the Deregulation Bill and the Draft Rules 
 
119 The Draft Rules were issued shortly before the provisions of the Deregulation 
Bill. It is, therefore, not clear whether the two were intended to interact, or if 
consequential amendments to the Draft Rules are envisaged by the Insolvency 
Service. The proposed amendments to paragraph 26(2) by the Deregulation Bill do 
not undermine the provisions of rule 3.22 of the Draft Rules. Indeed, arguably the 
two offer a level of clarification as to the issues raised initially in Minmar, and left 
unresolved by Re BXL Services, as to the requirement to serve notice of intention to 
appoint on the parties in Rule 2.20(2). These new provisions elevate the parties 
from their true position currently, being entitled to copy of any notice of intention 
to appoint being served on a QFCH pursuant to paragraph 26(1). If these reforms 
are brought in, both will entitle the persons in Rule 2.20(2) to actual notice, rather 
than simply a copy as under the Rules presently in force. This could have the 
apparently unforeseen, and surely unintended, consequence of delaying an 
administrator’s prompt appointment where a QFCH is consenting, or even lead to 





120 Whilst there has been much judicial and practitioner debate over the 
requirement to give notice of an intention to appoint administrators to the parties 
set out in Rule 2.20(2), it is arguable that this has been in vain. The provisions of 
paragraph 26(2) clearly state that the company or directors must give: 
 
“…such notice as may be prescribed to such other persons as may be prescribed.”159 
 
121 A systematic review of the provisions of the Rules and related prescribed 
forms shows that both elements of paragraph 26(2) have yet to be fulfilled. 
 
122 As such, under the current legislation it is not necessary for a company or its 
directors to serve notice of an intention to appoint administrators on the parties in 
Rule 2.20(2) in the absence of a QFCH. This is supported by an analysis of the 
statutory purposes for giving such notice, the nature and rights of the parties listed 
in Rule 2.20(2), and the choice of language therein. 
 
123 The courts have not, however, reached this conclusion. A number of contrary 
judgments have led to uncertainty and excess caution in the insolvency profession, 
                                                 
159 Paragraph 26(2), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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which appears to have been ill-founded. The severity of the issue has led, albeit 
belatedly, to proposed reform to both the primary and secondary legislation, the 
interpretation of which lies at the root of the current problem. The reforms put 
forward by the Government and the Insolvency Service, in the Deregulation Bill 
and the Draft Rules respectively, seek to address the issues left outstanding 
following the judgment of HHJ Purle in Re BXL Services. 
 
124 Whilst on first glance these reforms appear to do this, making it clear that 
service is not required on the persons in Rule 2.20(2) in the absence of a QFCH, as 
drafted they present further significant problems. Firstly, the reforms make it a clear 
requirement for notice of intention to appoint administrators, rather than simply a 
copy, to be served on the Rule 2.20(2) parties where notice is being given to a 
QFCH pursuant to paragraph 26(1). There is, however, no provision made for these 
persons to consent to an appointment being made before the expiry of five business 
days, as is the case for a QFCH. This could inadvertently prevent the prompt 
appointment of administrators by the company or its directors, or even result in 
purported appointment being invalid if the additional notice periods are not 
observed. Secondly, the Draft Rules do not prescribe any forms to be used in the 
appointment process, which is at odds with the requirements of Schedule B1 of the 
Act. 
 
125 It is good to see the Government, through the legislature and departments, 
seeking to address the current problems facing the insolvency profession with 
regard to administration appointments. However, it can be seen that this could be 
done simply by the issuing of guidance clarifying the true, and surely indisputable, 
construction of paragraphs 22 to 30 of Schedule B1. If the current reform is 
pursued, attention needs to be given to the apparently unforeseen consequences, 
which could have a similar effect on the profession as the current drafting. 
 
